William R Collier Jr

The Constitution IS the law of the land and the mere fact that for so long so many have been willing to abide such criminality does not in any wise change the material facts, it only changes the enforcement. The Constitution is the Law, those who violate it, especially in public trust, are in fact malefactors, criminals in a legal sense,  even if there is no enforcemen.

The present effort to “pass” a “law” which is, in point of fact not only a spending bill but the single largest in all of our history, through the Senate, as a means of compelling the People’s House into submission, is, in point of fact, a criminal activity as a violation of the oath of office and the theft of moneys not owed to the user or belonging to them.

Article 1 sect 7 of the Constitution reads:  All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives;

but the Senate may propose or concur with Amerndment as on other Bills.

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Can the Senate attach a spending bill as an AMENDMENT to other bills in order to effectively aborgate this requirement?

In law, to take a right one must meet a measure of proof, such as with criminal proceedings “beyond a reasonable doubt.” If therefore the House has a right to hold the purse and initiate spending, then to take that right requires not a “benefit of the doubt” in favor of the Senate, but proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

If this section was NOT clearly meant to give the House this right, it would not SAY so.  “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. This is the operative part, the secondary, conditional part, allowing for amendments, assumes that a bill has been passed.

The trick of bundling together bills that are not integral to the actual bill is clearly not logical if the intent is to give such power in its first instance to the House.

Clarification is provided, and explained in rather excruciating detail, below in Federalist No. 57………………

Federalist 57 explains why House initiates spending:

These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every department of the state in the general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.

In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.

As connected with the objection against the number of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us.

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To pass a $700 spending Bill, regardless of whether or not or help much money will be returned, as an “amendment” to two other bills, regarldess of their origination, which have already passed and which are clearly not directly related nor the sole purpose of the action, which is to rush into a quick vote, is a serious violation of the Constitution and ANY person proposing, voting for, “signing”, or acting upon such law is guilty of violating the oath of office.

It is tragic that to suggest what is the clear sense of the original intent of the section at question and what is equally the clear violation of the same is a serious offense which disqualifies one from office is “radical” or”unreasonable.”

The habitual, customary violation of the law, the general approbation of the general populace, or merely their aqcuiescence by ignorance of willfulness, does not in any wise change the material facts: that a law made has been violated, a law which necessarily demands the censure if not the impeachment of all persons in public office who violate it.

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