7-30-9
Israel News- US/Middle East Project Proposal to Obama- last chance for
two-state solution #israel #news

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Brent Scowcroft

Chair, International Board

U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT

Henry Siegman

President

A LAST CHANCE FOR A TWO-STATE

ISRAEL-PALESTINE AGREEMENT

A Bipartisan Statement on U.S. Middle East Peacemaking

By

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Chuck Hagel

Lee H. Hamilton

Carla Hills

Nancy Kassebaum-Baker

Thomas R. Pickering

Brent Scowcroft

Theodore C. Sorensen

Paul A. Volcker

James D. Wolfensohn

641 Lexington Avenue

Suite 1500

New York, N.Y. 10022

PHONE (212)
634-6378

FAX (212)
634-6377

E-MAIL
usmep@usmep.us

http://www.usmep.us/

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The following recommendations for U.S. Middle East
peacemaking were

submitted to the administration of President Barack Obama by
a bipartisan

group of ten former senior government officials: Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Chuck

Hagel, Lee H. Hamilton, Carla Hills, Nancy Kassebaum-Baker,
Thomas R.

Pickering, Brent Scowcroft, Theodore C. Sorensen, Paul A.
Volcker, and

James D. Wolfensohn. All of them are Senior Advisors of the
U.S./Middle

East Project and members of its International Board, chaired
by General

Scowcroft.

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CONTENTS

I Executive Summary

II Proposed Policy Directions

III Annex: Addressing Israel’s Security Challenges

IV List of Signatories

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We urge the next U.S. administration to engage in prompt,
sustained and determined

efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Previous initiatives having failed, the incoming
administration will no doubt be urged to

defer or avoid renewed engagement for three reasons:

1. Prioritizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would
distract the new president

from efforts to address critical challenges to the nation’s
security: Iraq, Iran,

Afghanistan, Russia, and threats from terror organizations.

2. Peace cannot be imposed by the U.S.A. or any outside
party. The only

enduring solution will be one conceived by the parties
themselves.

3. Pressing both sides to reach agreement may risk angering
domestic

constituencies.

We believe all three arguments are invalid.

Today, when our enemies avoid America’s military superiority
by waging information

warfare and terror, an early Arab-Israeli peace is
indispensable. Although a

comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would not erase Al Qaeda,
it would help drain the

swamp in which it and other violent and terrorist movements
thrive, and eliminate a

major source of global Muslim anti-Americanism. Iran would
find the strategic

advantages it recently gained in the Arab world greatly
reduced. Far from being a

distraction from other Middle Eastern crises, an
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement

would significantly facilitate their amelioration.

Conversely, for the U.S. to avoid effective facilitation and
mediation is to cede the field

to America’s enemies who are counting on the Arab-Israeli
dispute as the gift that keeps

on giving.

According to polls, most Israeli and Palestinian public
opinions back a fair settlement,

and Arab countries now offer unprecedented support for the
Arab Peace Initiative of

2002, spurred by the twin threats posed by Iran and radical
Islamist movements, and see

substantial strategic value in a comprehensive peace accord.
In Europe and elsewhere, a

strong U.S. initiative would be warmly welcomed.

A new U.S. effort to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement
may anger certain domestic

constituencies. We do not, however, believe it is beyond the
capability of any American

President to explain to the American people why this
long-running dispute must at long

last be ended and why it will take much diplomatic heavy
lifting and public expenditure

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to make it work. In the end the stakes are too high to
pursue a hands-off or arm’s-length

approach.

Unless the president tackles this problem early it is
unlikely to be done at all. Political

capital will erode; domestic obstacles will grow; other
issues will dominate; and the

warring parties will play for time and run the clock.

Failure to act would prove extremely costly. It would not
only undermine current efforts

to weaken extremist groups, bolster our moderate allies and
rally regional support to

stabilize Iraq and contain Iran, but would also risk
permanent loss of the two-state

solution as settlements expand and become entrenched and
extremists on both sides

consolidate their hold. In short, the next six to twelve
months may well represent the last

chance for a fair, viable and lasting solution.

To maximize the prospects for success, we urge three key
steps, drawing on lessons from

past successes and failures.

1. Present a Clear U.S. Vision to End the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The dispute

between the two sides is too deep, and the discrepancies of
power between them too

vast, for them to solve their conflict without the U.S.
acting as a determined outside

and evenhanded advocate and facilitator.

The most important step President Obama should take early in
his presidency is to

flesh out the outlines of a fair, viable and sustainable
agreement, based on principles

that both Israel and the Palestinians have previously
accepted by signing on to UN

Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Oslo Accords,
the 2003 Road Map,

and the 2007 Annapolis understandings. The charge that
advancing such principles

would constitute improper “outside impositions” is therefore
groundless.

The U.S. parameters should reflect the following fundamental
compromises:

• Two states, based on
the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal, and

agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap,
to take into

account areas heavily populated by Israelis in the West
Bank;

• A solution to the
refugee problem consistent with the two-state solution, that

does not entail a general right of return, addresses the
Palestinian refugees’

sense of injustice, and provides them with meaningful
financial compensation

as well as resettlement assistance;

• Jerusalem as home to
both capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under

Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian
sovereignty,

with special arrangements for the Old City providing each
side control of its

respective holy places and unimpeded access by each
community to them;

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• A non-militarized
Palestinian state, together with security mechanisms that

address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian
sovereignty, and a U.S.-

led multinational force to ensure a peaceful transitional
security period. This

coalition peacekeeping structure, under UN mandate, would
feature American

leadership of a NATO force supplemented by Jordanians,
Egyptians and

Israelis. We can envision a five-year, renewable mandate
with the objective

of achieving full Palestinian domination of security affairs
on the Palestine

side of the line within 15 years.

2. Encourage Israeli-Syrian Negotiations to fundamentally
transform the regional

landscape and ultimately detach Damascus from its uneasy
strategic partnership with

Iran. The next administration should be actively involved in
direct negotiations

between the two sides to try to bring them to closure, even
as it works actively on the

Israeli-Palestinian track.

3. A More Pragmatic Approach Toward Hamas and a Palestinian
Unity Government: A

legitimate, unified and empowered Palestinian side to
negotiate with Israel is of

importance if any agreement is to be reached and
implemented. Direct U.S.

engagement with Hamas may not now be practical, but shutting
out the movement

and isolating Gaza has only made it stronger and Fatah
weaker. Israel itself has

acknowledged Hamas is simply too important and powerful to
be ignored.

In brief, shift the U.S. objective from ousting Hamas to
modifying its behavior, offer

it inducements that will enable its more moderate elements
to prevail, and cease

discouraging third parties from engaging with Hamas in ways
that might help clarify

the movement’s views and test its behavior.

Finally, cease discouraging Palestinian national
reconciliation and make clear that a

government that agrees to a ceasefire with Israel, accepts
President Mahmoud Abbas

as the chief negotiator, and commits to abiding by the
results of a national referendum

on a future peace agreement would not be boycotted or
sanctioned.

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PROPOSED POLICY DIRECTIONS

I. Arab-Israeli Peace in the Context of American Interests
and Capabilities

For the better part of six decades American presidents have
struggled to define

how best to help Israelis and Arabs resolve bitter disputes
left behind by wars and

dislocations in 1948 and 1967 and deepened ever since. A
significant achievement – the

creation and sustaining of a democratic Jewish State in the
wake of the Holocaust – was

accompanied by considerable and ongoing Palestinian
suffering. While the intimacy of

the American-Israeli relationship is highly valued by
Americans and Israelis alike, this

very intimacy – compounded by the unresolved consequences of
past wars and current

controversies – presents policy and security challenges for
the U.S. in the Middle East

and beyond. At no time since 1948 has this been truer than
now, seven years after the

9/11 terror attacks and more than five years after the
invasion of Iraq.

We have long had vital strategic interests in the Middle
East: Israel’s survival;

assured access to vital natural resources; the security of
strategic transportation routes;

and close relations with friends and allies in the Arab
world. 9/11 added a new national

security dimension to the pursuit of American interests in
the Arab-Israeli context. These

interests are enduring. Their achievement is facilitated
when the U.S. is seen as

genuinely pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.

Osama Bin Laden did not commission attacks in New York and
Washington,

D.C. to “free Palestine.” Yet tens of millions of young men
and women in the Arab

world and the Muslim world beyond – the products of
demographic “youth bulges” in

challenged economies – are targeted for recruitment by
al-Qaeda and its affiliates partly

on the basis of ongoing defeat, injustice and humiliation in
the Arab-Israeli context.

Some of these recruits have found their way to Iraq. Others
no doubt await opportunities

to strike at American interests and persons. Sadly, the
post-9/11 U.S. waited until the end

of the current administration to make a concerted effort to
encourage talks between

Palestinians and Israelis, even though the invasion and
occupation of Iraq produced yet

more challenges to America’s standing in the Middle East.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has not distinguished itself in
its material support for

Palestinians in cities, villages and refugee camps. Yet
Iran’s program of penetrating the

Arab world and challenging governments friendly to the U.S.
rests in significant measure

on exploiting Palestinian misery and grievance. Indeed, its
proxy in Lebanon

(Hezbollah) bases its so-called “resistance” not only on
Lebanese issues, but on its

proclaimed desire to “liberate Jerusalem.”

In an era where enemies of the U.S. avoid confronting
America’s military

superiority and instead wage information warfare and
practice terror, taking advantage of

failed and failing states to kill Americans and defeat
American interests, it is essential

that the incoming administration make Arab-Israeli peace a
high national security

priority from the beginning. A comprehensive Arab-Israel
peace will not erase al-Qaeda.

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Yet it would help drain the swamp in which the disease
thrives and mutates. Israeli

treaties with Palestine, Syria and Lebanon would bring the
entire Arab League into the

peace camp in line with the Arab Peace Initiative. An Iran
still hostile to the U.S. and

Israel would find the strategic advantages it has recently
gained in the Arab world all but

eliminated.

Our relationship with Israel is what makes the U.S. central
in brokering a

comprehensive peace. Security assistance and strategic
dialogue aim to guarantee

Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over any conceivable
array of enemies and strengthen

the U.S.-Israel security partnership. Still, within Israel
there are strong and vocal

minorities opposing peace; not in word, but in deed.
Militant settlers and their political

supporters want nothing to do with the kinds of compromises
– the “painful concessions”

in the words of Ariel Sharon – that would create a viable
Palestinian state and secure

peace with Syria and Lebanon. Theirs is a vision of
perpetual conflict over real estate

and settlement expansion; warfare welcomed, ironically, as a
gift of unsurpassed value by

the enemies of the U.S. and Israel. Yet most Israelis
understand and appreciate that, at

the end of the day, what really matters most for Israel’s
security is a relationship of trust,

confidence and friendship with the U.S. and, in particular,
with the President of the

United States. A Government of Israel deciding to make the
hard compromises and

painful concessions for peace simply must be able to say, as
a matter of domestic political

survival, “The President – and thus the U.S. – is with us
and wants us to do this for the

cause of peace.”

Israel’s interlocutors – Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese
– also want and need

us “at the table.” The only way we can (and have) hurt
Israel is when we are AWOL and

absent ourselves from the task of helping to create a
sustainable, comprehensive peace

between it and its neighbors. That which Arab parties need
from us is precisely what

Israeli peacemakers – representing the majority of Israelis
– need: unstinting American

moral and material support for a Government of Israel
willing to do what must be done to

make peace with all of its neighbors. It is the intimate
nature of the U.S.-Israel

relationship that makes the U.S. and its President
absolutely vital in assisting Israel to

settle the unresolved issues between it and its neighbors.

At the center of this conflict are two peoples – Israeli and
Palestinian – who want

and deserve peace after all these years of struggle. Each
side believes it is the other that

holds the key to peace and the other that must take the
decisive first step. Trust and

confidence between them – never strong at any time over the
past 60 years – have

reached a nadir. The U.S. role in these difficult
circumstances is to do all it can to help

restore trust and confidence by building effective
cooperation and limiting breakdowns in

the process. Yet, even more, the US will have to convince
each side that compromise is

essential; it will have to do so insistently and
systematically, for there are painful

concessions required of all. This will require a careful
blend of persuasion, inducement,

reward and pressure aimed at changing a “lose-lose” dynamic
to one reflecting mutual

benefit.

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There is a cliché – one that has the merit of truth – to the
effect that “Everyone

knows, more or less, what the peace treaties will say; the
hard part is getting to the

signings.” There has been no shortage of unofficial,
bilateral drafting of “treaty”

language – this is hardly a “wheel” to be “reinvented.”
Indeed, the outline of an Israeli-

Palestinian accord was crafted during the dying days of the
Clinton administration. Yet

getting to the end-game will be anything but easy.

Incoming Presidents have many priorities (foreign and
domestic) and are fully

subject to the unexpected crisis and unplanned-for
emergency. While the outgoing

administration found ways to avoid consistent and insistent
engagement, the centrality of

the President in “getting to yes” raises for the
conscientious Chief Executive the risk of

too much time and exposure being demanded of the Oval
Office; the kind of profile that

inspired some in the incoming Bush administration to
describe President Clinton as “the

Israeli-Palestinian desk officer” because of
his last-minute attempts to make peace.

There is no avoiding the decisive role of the President or
the necessity of engagement if

Americans and their interests are to be protected. Yet no
President – especially one

inheriting two wars – can afford to be riveted by
Arab-Israeli peacemaking at the expense

of the rest of the world.

We think that a presidential Special Envoy – someone in whom
the President has

extraordinary confidence – can help reserve presidential
input for truly decisive moments

while pressing the parties toward closure. The parties must
have confidence in the

impartiality of this person and see him or her as someone
who speaks authoritatively for

the President. Otherwise there will be successful attempts
to end-run the Envoy and

throw the U.S. facilitation effort into chaos. Discipline is
essential: the parties must see

the Special Envoy as operating with the full backing of the
President and the entire

executive branch.

Regardless of how the new administration organizes to deal
with Arab-Israeli

matters it will not avoid domestic political controversy.
There are Jewish-American and

Christian Zionist groups that feel comfortable amplifying
the positions of Israeli

politicians hostile to hard compromise and painful
concession. At times the

administration may take positions coordinated with an
Israeli Prime Minister who may

nevertheless feel unable, for domestic political reasons, to
acknowledge his or her

complicity. Moreover, there are virtually limitless ways in
which actions and words

emanating from Arab parties can make constructive American
behavior look ridiculous.

A disciplined American diplomatic approach can inadvertently
yield bouts of domestic

political unpleasantness that can spill over onto other
priorities.

We do not, however, believe it is beyond the capability of
any American

President to explain to the American people why this
long-running dispute must at long

last be ended and why it will take much diplomatic heavy
lifting and public expenditure

to make it work. In the end the stakes are too high to
pursue a hands-off or arm’s-length

approach. The extremist and terrorist enemies of everything
America stands for are

counting on the Arab-Israeli dispute to be a gift that keeps
on giving. To avoid the

difficult tasks of effective facilitation and mediation is
to cede the field to America’s

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enemies. Seen in this light the often unpleasant and
frustrating aspects of Arab-Israeli

peace making are considerably less costly than neglect:
benign or otherwise.

II. Obstacles to Successful Negotiations

If facilitating and mediating Arab-Israeli peace were easy,
peace would have long

ago been achieved. The following list of obstacles is
impressive, though possibly not

comprehensive.

• Deep distrust at
the popular level. Palestinians feel the crushing, demoralizing

weight of occupation and have little confidence in Israel’s
willingness to lift it

voluntarily. Israelis see violence and terror emanating from
the Palestinian side

as the continuation of a long history of Jews being targeted
because they are

Jews. Israelis and Syrians see each other as aliens
inhabiting different planets.

The idea that Israelis and Lebanese could get along if only
left alone by others

has perhaps long since expired. Even in today’s incomplete
circle of peace –

Egypt, Israel and Jordan – there is precious little warmth
at the popular level.

• Weak governments
and chronic disunity in Israel. The typical Government of

Israel is a multi-party coalition whose unifying theme often
amounts to no more

than a desire to avoid national elections for as long as
possible in order to retain

control of key ministries. While the desire to perpetuate
incumbency often

inspires grudging party discipline, disloyalty and
back-stabbing are often

ubiquitous within cabinets. A prime minister sincerely
interested in achieving

critical mass for comprehensive peace needs enormous
political skills, steady

American support (sometimes disguised as pressure),
cooperation and good will

from Arab parties deeply skeptical of Israeli intentions,
and considerable good

fortune.

• West Bank-Gaza/Fatah-Hamas
split. Disunity also plagues the Palestinian side.

Since June 2007 Hamas – which has rejected the Quartet’s
conditions for

engagement – has ruled the Gaza Strip. Fatah governs the
Palestinian Authority

(PA) from the West Bank, but it is not clear how far its
writ runs beyond

Ramallah. PA President Mahmoud Abbas tries to maintain an
uneasy balance

between a competent, reforming prime minister (Salam Fayyad)
and an

incompetent, corrupt old guard. Israeli-Palestinian violence
in and around Gaza

undermines the prospects for negotiating success and renders
impossible the full

implementation of any agreement reached. The absence of
Palestinian unity – at

least in the form of a PA governing all of the occupied
territories – makes the

negotiating process problematical at best. Israel cannot
make peace with only a

part of the Palestinian polity, and it is not clear how long
pro-peace Palestinian

leaders can stay in office.

• External Negative
Influences. Syria and Iran, through their support for Hamas,

other Palestinian “rejectionist” groups, and Hezbollah,
actively aim to keep

Israeli and Palestinian talks from reaching closure. For
Syria the policy dictum

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(and palpable fear) since the 1993 Oslo Agreement with
respect to the recovery

of occupied territory has been quite simple: “Palestine
first, Syria never.” For

Iran, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab violence
offers a golden

opportunity to penetrate the Arab world politically (as it
has done with

considerable success in Lebanon and Syria) and marginalize
the U.S.

strategically.

• Ineffective, half-hearted
American facilitation. The belated Annapolis initiative

is a sincere but flawed effort to compensate for seven years
of American

absenteeism from substantive peace talks. It asks Israelis
and Palestinians to

negotiate in good faith and simultaneously implement Quartet
“roadmap”

obligations, with no Americans in the room to help with
talks and an

insufficient, part-time U.S. effort to “monitor” roadmap
implementation. It

discourages diplomatic efforts aimed at identifying ways –
if they exist – to

bring elements of Hamas “into the tent.” In effect it hands
the power of veto to

terrorists and extremists.

• U.S.-Syrian
distrust. Relations between Washington and Damascus – never

warm – went ice cold after the invasion of Iraq and into the
deep freeze after the

assassination of Lebanon’s Rafiq Hariri. Even though an
Israeli-Syrian peace

treaty could detach Damascus from the orbit of Iran and
clear Israel’s way for

peace with the Palestinians and Lebanon, U.S. support for
Israel’s approach in

this regard has been grudging because of understandable
animus toward

Damascus (and Tehran) and a lack of appetite for tough,
give-and-take

diplomacy. Washington has seen Syria as irretrievably in the
thrall of Tehran,

addicted to state sponsorship of terrorism and a permanent
enemy of Lebanese

independence and democracy. The administration has hoped
that the Special

Tribunal created to bring to justice the murderers of Rafiq
Hariri would

somehow bring the regime in Damascus to heel; an analytical
judgment not

shared by Israel.

III. Substantive Issues to be Resolved

Israel-Palestine

• Territory.
Borders of the two states would be based on the 1967 armistice

lines. Yet they would likely be adjusted by mutual agreement
in order to take

into account areas heavily populated by Israelis in the West
Bank since 1967

and equivalent areas to be ceded to Palestine in exchange.
The Gaza Strip is

not under contention, but the amount of the West Bank to be
ceded to Israel

and the nature of any “swap” to compensate the Palestinian
side will be

controversial. The aim will be to incorporate large
settlement blocs within

Israel while preserving Palestinian contiguity both within
the West Bank and

between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the latter by
means of a corridor

(whose characteristics await definition) linking the two, in
an effort to provide

each state with the territorial size determined by the 1967
line.

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• Security. The
borders between the two states must be physically secure and

fully controlled for their entire length. A U.S.-led
multinational force would

likely be essential for a transitional period once a peace
agreement is

concluded. Palestine would likely be non-militarized. No
doubt Jerusalem

will require a special security and administrative regime of
its own and special

arrangements will be needed for the use and regulation of
Palestinian airspace.

• Jerusalem.
Ideally the city would remain physically undivided while

accommodating two national capitals, with Jewish holy places
administered by

Israel and Muslim and Christian holy places administered by
Palestine. Yet

worsening security conditions accompanying the “Al Aqsa
Intifada” beginning

in September 2000 have perhaps made it mandatory (at least
for a transitional

period) for physical controls to secure Israeli and
Palestinian areas of control.

The formula of Israel governing Jewish neighborhoods and
Palestine

governing Arab neighborhoods largely works. Special
arrangements, however,

will be needed for the Old City and the Historic Basin of
which it is a part. In

some cases (most notably the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif)
creative

approaches to control merit close examination.

• Refugees. For
Israelis the “right of return” issue is the ultimate “third rail.”

For Palestinians, the entitlement of four million refugees
to justice and dignity

is an absolute. A formula must be found to protect Israel
from an influx of

refugees, assist Palestine to absorb as many refugees as
possible, and offer

Palestinian refugees options for productive and dignified
lives in Palestine or

elsewhere, closing refugee camps wherever they exist. This
will be an

undertaking requiring substantial resources. While Arab
support will be

critical, so will American leadership and Israeli
cooperation.

• Water. Even
during the worst of times Israeli and Palestinian water officials

and experts have found it possible to speak and act in ways
consistent with the

proper administration of a scarce and vital shared resource.
Still, terms will

have to be reached protecting Israel’s access to aquifers
lying largely beneath

Palestinian territory while permitting Palestine to develop
its water resources

to support an expanding population as well as agricultural
and industrial

development. Desalination can play an important role in
increasing municipal

water supplies for both parties, and cooperation in the
water sector can build

strong ties between Israel, Palestine and Jordan.

Israel-Syria

• Territory.
Syria desires the return of all territory lost to Israel in June 1967.

Should Israel comply, Syria would regain the Golan Heights
plus about 12 square

miles of land in the Jordan Valley, including beach-front
property on the

northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee (Israel’s natural
reservoir).

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• Water. Israel
wishes to protect its full jurisdiction over water resources in the

Israeli part of the Jordan Valley (including the Sea of
Galilee) and ensure that a

return of the Golan Heights to Syria does not create
environmental problems

affecting water vital to Israel. Israel also wants Jordan
River sources beyond its

sovereign control to flow relatively unobstructed. “Syria
gets the line, Israel gets

the water” is the essence of the tradeoff.

• Security.
Demilitarization of the Golan Heights and limited forces zones on both

sides – all likely to be supervised by multinational forces
featuring American

leadership – will be mandatory.

• Access.
Regardless of where the official boundary is placed, Israelis – loath to

give up the Golan Heights for any price – will want easy
access to the full

circumference of the Sea of Galilee.

• Iran-Lebanon-Hamas.
Israel will want to be certain that the return of territory to

Syria in accordance with a peace treaty will be preceded or
accompanied by a

strategic decision by Syria to participate in no
anti-Israeli alliances of any kind.

Moreover, Syria would be expected to use its influence to
encourage Lebanon to

reach a formal peace with Israel and to negate any threats
to Israel from Lebanese

territory. Finally, (assuming a “Syria first” scenario)
Israel would want Damascus

to use its influence with Hamas and other Palestinian
organizations to facilitate

Israeli-Palestinian peace.

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ANNEX: ADDRESSING ISRAEL’S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Peace between Israelis and Palestinians will not occur
without a two-state

solution. Although risk-taking is an essential and
unavoidable element of settling longstanding

conflicts, Israel will wish to trade little if anything in
physical security for a

peace agreement creating a Palestinian state. This means
that the detailed working out of

mutually acceptable security arrangements to help govern and
guide the Israel-Palestine

bilateral relationship is mandatory.

A state, by definition, possesses a monopoly on the lawful,
legitimate use of

violence. Yet even in strong, well-established states
criminal elements undertake illegal

acts – some involving violence – across boundaries into
neighboring states. Although

Israel may face challenges in this regard in the context of
a two-state outcome, clearly it

is the Palestinian side that requires (and is currently
receiving) outside assistance in the

security arena. Beyond the current efforts we expect that,
upon the full agreement of the

parties, there will be a robust international effort
involving outside armed forces for a

period of indeterminate length assisting Palestinian
authorities in executing their

responsibilities in the security sphere and helping them
build capacity in order eventually

to act without outside assistance.

In the end either the State of Palestine will be fully
responsible, accountable and

competent in its security responsibilities vis-à-vis its
neighbors (especially Israel) or the

two-state “solution” will fall short of solving the security
problems afflicting Palestinians

and Israelis. Indeed, interim security arrangements – albeit
those consented to by the

Palestinian side in the context of full agreement with
Israel – are likely to be very

intrusive. These interim arrangements could involve various
scenarios and combinations

of actors: continued Israeli domination of the security
scene; shared U.S., third country,

Israeli and Palestinian roles in interim security
arrangements; or a leading Palestinian role

complemented by close cooperation with Israel and third
country support as required.

Whatever the scenario and combination arrived at, the goal
should be to build

bilateral cooperation and mutual confidence. Interim
security arrangements should be

fully agreed to by the parties and blessed by a UN Security
Council resolution setting out

the parameters of international support for the parties.
Naturally the U.S. will play a

large and perhaps decisive role. Yet it should not act alone
– there should be broad

participation reflecting international consensus on the
importance of supporting the

emergence of a truly sustainable two-state outcome.

While potential scenarios and actors are numerous, we can
envision a coalition

peacekeeping structure under UN mandate featuring American
leadership of a NATO

force supplemented by Jordanians, Egyptians and Israelis. We
can envision a five-year,

renewable mandate with the objective of achieving full
Palestinian domination of security

affairs on the Palestine side of the line within 15 years.
Yet we fully understand the

complexities of terms of reference, rules of engagement,
contributing states, funding and

the like. We are less interested in prescribing a specific
formula than we are in

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emphasizing that, whatever the approach, it must be flexible
and yet focus relentlessly on

building enduring, positive relationships between the
parties themselves. Creating trust

and changing attitudes are the central objectives. Failure
in this respect would be to

substitute one form of occupation for another and to
frustrate the implementation of a real

two-state solution.

In its dying days the Bush administration – in conjunction
with its Annapolis

peace initiative – took notice of this challenge and
launched a constructive initiative

involving the appointment of General (Ret.) James Jones as
Special Envoy for Middle

East Regional Security. As a former Commandant of the U.S.
Marine Corps, NATO

Supreme Commander and Commander of the European Command,
General Jones has,

since his appointment in November 2007, worked closely with
Israelis and Palestinians

on a broad range of security issues. He and his staff have
also engaged the Government

of Israel and other friendly states in detailed discussions
of strategic priorities and needs

from the perspectives of several regional political-military
scenarios.

The Jones team made two critical discoveries early in its
tenure: first, it was not

inheriting anything resembling a comprehensive, systematic
body of work already done

by the U.S. Government on Israeli security challenges in the
context of a two-state

outcome; and second, any specific recommendations produced
by such a body of work

would be entirely dependent on prevailing conditions, many
of which can and should be

shaped by vigorous American diplomacy. For example:

• Is there a coherent
Palestinian polity with professional, capable security forces

willing and able to cooperate and coordinate with Israeli
security forces?

• Are there neighboring
and other regional states – Egypt and Jordan for sure, but

perhaps even others – willing and able to buttress
Palestinian security forces and

reinforce security cooperation/coordination between the two
parties?

• Is the broader
regional situation one in which Iran, supported by Syria and

Hezbollah, retains the role of spoiler, or will the
implementation of a two-state

treaty be preceded, accompanied, or followed in short order
by a détente between

Iran and the West (including Israel)?

The one constant in all of this has been Israel’s insistence
that it will not consent to

two-state arrangements unless it concludes that Israel’s
security will not be substantially

harmed by removing the IDF from the West Bank. The dilemma,
however, is that West

Bank security measures being implemented now by the IDF tend
to produce conditions

on the ground that prevent the formation of a coherent
Palestinian polity with

professional, capable security forces willing and able to
cooperate and coordinate with

Israeli forces.

This is not to say that all or even any of these measures –
barriers, check-points,

armed interventions into Palestinian populated areas – lack
security justifications. Some

may be gratuitous and no doubt there are ongoing behavioral
issues involving IDF

16

interface with Palestinian civilians. The key point,
however, is that there is a very

frustrating and debilitating “chicken and egg” situation in
which Israel’s understandable

anxiety about suicide bombings and other terrorism has
produced a West Bank security

regime that, by all accounts, reflects poorly on the PA,
creates massive economic

hardships and in general makes it hard to envision and
implement measures that could

support a sustained Israeli-Palestinian security
partnership. Absent such a partnership it

is difficult to envision a self-sustaining two-state
outcome. As noted above, the key task

of any interim security arrangements would be to build
bilateral trust and confidence to

the point where such a partnership could take hold on its
own.

In the past, Israel’s security “default position” with
respect to withdrawal from

occupied territories has centered on securing increased
security assistance funding from

the U.S. This was certainly the case when Israel returned
the Sinai to Egypt. No doubt it

would have been the case had Israeli-Syrian negotiations in
early 2000 borne fruit.

Surely a defense “shopping list” will accompany any serious
consideration of withdrawal

from the West Bank. Such a list should be received
positively and acted upon promptly.

It will be important, however, to stay focused on producing
the conditions that will

make a two-state outcome acceptable to decisive majorities
on both sides. Finding and

implementing ways to break the destructive “chicken and egg”
dynamic in the occupied

Palestinian territories will be far more important than
trying to calculate what additional

capabilities the IDF will need to counter conventional and
unconventional threats.

Although there are many difficulties, downsides and
complexities associated with large

peacekeeping operations, no one sincerely interested in
short-circuiting the current

destructive dynamic can rule out such a possibility or
dismiss the prospect of a major

American role in it. We believe that General Jones and his
team have not ruled this out.

Although General Jones’ mandate has focused exclusively on
the Israel-Palestine

track, clearly there would also be a robust American role in
implementing the securityrelated

aspects of any Israel-Syria accord. Beyond helping the IDF
with improving

capabilities designed to compensate for full withdrawal from
territory occupied on the

Syrian front since 1967, the U.S. would undoubtedly play a
vital role in monitoring a

demilitarized Golan Heights and providing early warning
services to both parties.

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, however, the broad
objective is to provide Israelis

and Palestinians the security they need without
subordinating one to the other. This will

inevitably require a robust third-party presence to make a
transition from a state of zero

bilateral trust and confidence to the point where the
parties interact cooperatively and

effectively on a state-to-state basis. In order effectively
to end 60 years of conflict there

is no avoiding the necessity of the outside world resolving
and acting to make this

transition work between the parties while neutralizing the
destructive efforts of potential

spoilers.

In our view there is no avoiding a central U.S. role in
helping the parties (especially

the Palestinian side) meet their security-related
responsibilities to each other in the

context of two states.

17

LIST OF SIGNATORIES

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Counselor and Trustee, Center for
Strategic and International Studies;

former National Security Adviser to President Carter.

Chuck Hagel Distinguished Professor at the Walsh School
of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University; Former member U.S. Senate.

Lee H. Hamilton Director, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars; Co-Chair

of the Iraq Study Group; Vice Chairman of the 9/11
Commission;

former Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Carla A. Hills Chief Executive Officer of Hills &
Company; former U.S. Trade

Representative under President George H.W. Bush and former

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under President
Gerald

R. Ford.

Nancy Kassebaum-Baker Former member U.S. Senate.

Thomas R. Pickering Former Senior Vice President, Boeing
Corporation; former Under

Secretary of State and former United States Ambassador to
the United

Nations.

Brent Scowcroft Chair, U.S./Middle East Project;
President, Forum for International

Policy; President and Founder, The Scowcroft Group; former
National

Security Adviser to President Gerald Ford and President
George H.W.

Bush.

Theodore C. Sorensen Of Counsel,
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP; former

Special Counsel and Adviser to President John F. Kennedy.

Paul A. Volcker Chair of President Obama’s Economic
Advisory Group; Chairman of

the Board of Trustees of the Group of Thirty; Honorary
Chairman of

the Trilateral Commission; former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve.

James D. Wolfensohn Chairman ,Wolfensohn and Company
L.L.C; former President of the

World Bank and former Special Envoy for the Gaza
Disengagement for

the Quartet on the Middle East.

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